Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation
This talk overviews our recent work on TLBlur, a novel approach that leverages compiler instrumentation and the recent AEX-Notify hardware extension in modern, off-the-shelf Intel SGX processors to limit the bandwidth of controlled-channel attacks at acceptable performance overhead. We also discuss ongoing efforts to reduce instrumentation costs through binary layout optimizations.
Authors
- Frank Piessens (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5438-153X)
- Flavio Toffalini (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7114-5640)
- Mathias Payer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5054-7547)
- Jo Van Bulck (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5953-9196)
- Andrés Sánchez (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9408-5230)
- Daan Vanoverloop (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-4914-9801)
- Victor Bullynck
Institutions
- Amazon (United States) (US)
- Amazon (Germany) (DE)
- Electric Propulsion Laboratory (United States) (US)
- KU Leuven (BE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference
- Published
- 2025-03-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2025.103
- Primary Topic
- Distributed and Parallel Computing Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00