Is There a Right to Revelatory Autonomy?

We address the question of when it is permissible to interfere in the “transformative choices” of others—choices whether or not to undergo experiences that provide us with knowledge we can only get by undergoing them, and which as a result transform our core values and preferences. In doing so, we criticise Farbod Akhlaghi’s recent (2023) claim to have discovered a new moral right, such that interference in the transformative choices of others is permissible when and only when the chooser’s “right to revelatory autonomy” (RRA) is outweighed. In building our case for a more plausible answer to the question, we challenge all aspects of Akhlaghi’s account. We first argue that it fares no better epistemically than other accounts he rejects, and that it fails to provide a more plausible explanation of permissible interference. We then examine RRA itself closely, showing that on its most plausible reading it is both over-inclusive (since it cannot hold in relation to a wide range of transformative choices) and under-inclusive (since it would hold for many choices unlikely to be transformative in the relevant sense). While Akhlaghi’s core insight—that our practices of interference (including by attempts to rationally persuade) in the transformative choices of others are much less likely to be justified than we standardly take them to be—is both true and important, the deontic innovation with which he tries to illuminate this point serves only to obscure it.