Why Do Armed Nonstate Actors Introduce Codes of Conduct? Explaining al-Qaeda’s “General Guidelines for Jihad”

Abstract Why do armed nonstate actors introduce codes of conduct? To answer this puzzle the article introduces a new theoretical framework that suggests that codes of conduct could stem from (i) a need to reduce control problems in the absence of sufficient coercive capacity; (ii) wishes to signal to states, nongovernmental organizations, and local populations the group’s intentions and commitments; and (iii) aspirations to educate and influence other groups within the same social movement. Then, using the case of al-Qaeda’s 2013 code of conduct, titled “General Guidelines for Jihad,” the article probes the three hypotheses. Ultimately, it finds that in al-Qaeda’s case, control problems, emerging following the external shock of the Global War on Terrorism, concomitant internal structural changes (primarily, the beginning of franchising), operatives’ excessive targeting of innocents, and the Arab uprisings, produced severe control problems to which the code was a partial solution. Signaling to local communities (but not to the international community) appears to have also played a role in the code’s introduction. Finally, the study presents some evidence that al-Qaeda also wished to use the code to influence fellow groups within the jihadi movement to follow its example.