Impoliteness, power and ethics

Abstract In their endeavor to theorize impoliteness from a Levinasian perspective, Xie and Fan (2024. Theorizing impoliteness: A Levinasian perspective. Journal of Politeness Research 20(1). 157–181) have recently proposed the concept of the ethics of impoliteness. In this paper, I seek to conceptualize these ethics in terms of power in a broader sense. I argue that (1) impoliteness, as the exercise of power, is ethical when it is employed not to ridicule, insult, threaten or dominate the other, or control the other’s action, but to defend one’s individuality, call for respect and understanding, and ultimately to ensure dialogue on equal terms, (2) as mundane communicative practice, it is arguably more substantial and instrumental than politeness in negotiating individual difference, reshaping human character and transforming social relationships, and (3) when it is employed to challenge, interrupt, or transcend an existing power relation, the efforts of both members of an interactive dyad are required if equality in communication is to be achieved. I then apply this perspective to excerpts from a literary classic, namely, Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice , in order to explore in what sense impoliteness is ethical and in what sense it is not.