Transcendental philosophical and neuroscientific theories of consciousness

Abstract Contemporary models of neural network function describe the brain as an “active system”, intrinsically generating patterns of activity that pre-structure top-down processing prior to extrinsic stimulation. In this context, self-relatedness is proposed to be one fundamental feature of this spontaneous brain activity. Self-relatedness has been postulated as a neuronal mechanism predominantly involving cortical midline regions ascribed to the so-called default mode network (DMN). This system essentially attributes the degree of self - or non-self -relevance to any interoceptive or exteroceptive stimuli (and by doing this, transforming stimuli in specific self - or non-self -like contents, possibly becoming objects in higher-level processes, particularly self-referential thinking). The focus of this paper is to demonstrate that the model of spontaneous brain activity has some important similarities to central aspects of transcendental philosophical theories of consciousness and subjectivity. For example, in German idealism the term ‘self’ or ‘ego’ refers to a spontaneous organisation capacity of the mind able to generate the very distinction between oneself and other , subject and object within the consciousness, pre-structuring mental processes prior to any specific function (e.g., sensory, cognitive processes). Furthermore, the processing of an informational content across multiple layers of consciousness corresponds to a logical sequence of different states (state of subject-object- undifferentiation , subject-object- differentiation , subject-object- integration ). We conclude, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy there must be a structural parallelism between these logical categories defining the essence of mental states, and their neuronal substrate. Otherwise, it would be hardly conceivable how a mapping of two different regional ontological domains, such as mental and neural processes, could occur.