Social coordination perpetuates stereotypic expectations and behaviors across generations in deep multiagent reinforcement learning
Despite often being perceived as morally objectionable, stereotypes are a common feature of social groups, a phenomenon that has often been attributed to biased motivations or limits on the ability to process information. We argue that one reason for this continued prevalence is that preexisting expectations about how others will behave, in the context of social coordination, can change the behaviors of one's social partners, creating the very stereotype one expected to see, even in the absence of other potential sources of stereotyping. We use a computational model of dynamic social coordination to illustrate how this "feedback loop" can emerge, engendering and entrenching role-consistent stereotypic behavior and then show that human behavior on the task generates a comparable feedback loop. Notably, people's choices on the task are not related to social dominance or system justification, suggesting biased motivations are not necessary to maintain these stereotypes.
Authors
- Ethan Jackson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8988-302X)
- William A. Cunningham (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7063-5859)
- Rebekah Gelpí (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-0520)
- Yikai Tang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3498-3557)
Institutions
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Vector Institute (CA)
- Schwartz/Reisman Emergency Medicine Institute (CA)
Publication Details
- Journal
- PNAS Nexus
- Published
- 2025-02-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf076
- Primary Topic
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada