Social coordination perpetuates stereotypic expectations and behaviors across generations in deep multiagent reinforcement learning

Despite often being perceived as morally objectionable, stereotypes are a common feature of social groups, a phenomenon that has often been attributed to biased motivations or limits on the ability to process information. We argue that one reason for this continued prevalence is that preexisting expectations about how others will behave, in the context of social coordination, can change the behaviors of one's social partners, creating the very stereotype one expected to see, even in the absence of other potential sources of stereotyping. We use a computational model of dynamic social coordination to illustrate how this "feedback loop" can emerge, engendering and entrenching role-consistent stereotypic behavior and then show that human behavior on the task generates a comparable feedback loop. Notably, people's choices on the task are not related to social dominance or system justification, suggesting biased motivations are not necessary to maintain these stereotypes.

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Publication Details

Journal
PNAS Nexus
Published
2025-02-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf076
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Social coordination perpetuates stereotypic expectations and behaviors across generations in deep multiagent reinforcement learning

Ethan Jackson, William A. Cunningham, Rebekah Gelpí, Yikai Tang
PNAS Nexus
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Social coordination perpetuates stereotypic expectations and behaviors across generations in deep multiagent reinforcement learning

Ethan Jackson, William A. Cunningham, Rebekah Gelpí, Yikai Tang
article en

Abstract

Despite often being perceived as morally objectionable, stereotypes are a common feature of social groups, a phenomenon that has often been attributed to biased motivations or limits on the ability to process information. We argue that one reason for this continued prevalence is that preexisting expectations about how others will behave, in the context of social coordination, can change the behaviors of one's social partners, creating the very stereotype one expected to see, even in the absence of other potential sources of stereotyping. We use a computational model of dynamic social coordination to illustrate how this "feedback loop" can emerge, engendering and entrenching role-consistent stereotypic behavior and then show that human behavior on the task generates a comparable feedback loop. Notably, people's choices on the task are not related to social dominance or system justification, suggesting biased motivations are not necessary to maintain these stereotypes.

PNAS NexusVol. 4(3)
University of Toronto (CA), Vector Institute (CA), Schwartz/Reisman Emergency Medicine Institute (CA)
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Openalex Percentile: Top 95%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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