Legal constraint through political means? Legal foundations and public support for executive action

Abstract Many scholars question the extent to which presidents are legally constrained, but others argue that public opinion provides an indirect but important mechanism through which law checks unilateral power. Through thirteen survey experiments, we examine whether the legal foundations of executive action—whether framed as pursuant to delegated statutory authority or contra the will of Congress—affect public support for unilateralism. Legal frames can influence public support, particularly among those with the strongest attachments to the rule of law. However, these effects are highly concentrated in hypothetical vignettes or temporally distant cases. Legal frames have little effect on support for executive action by recent presidents, even when they shape public perceptions of an action’s legality. Our results inform debates about the conditions under which public opinion might serve as a backstop against democratic backsliding by checking presidential overreach, and the role of law in shaping public debates about presidential power.