Quality Certifications Influence User-Generated Ratings

Abstract Platforms present various certifications to signal the quality of their offerings to prospective consumers. For example, Airbnb.com designates some hosts as “Superhosts” to distinguish properties that provide superior experiences. Platforms also present user-generated ratings—typically elicited and presented as “star ratings”—from their customers for the same purpose. This research investigates the interaction of these signals of quality and suggests a potential downside to platform-provided certifications: They decrease subsequent ratings. In an analysis of over 1,500,000 ratings from Airbnb.com and three follow-up studies, we find that properties with the superhost designation receive lower ratings. We assess the robustness of this result in several ways, including comparing ratings on Airbnb with those for the same property on Vrbo. In three follow-up experiments, we find that the net effect of certifications can lead to reduced choice share: The positive effect of signaling quality is more than offset by the negative effect of reduced ratings. This suggests that consumers are not sufficiently aware of this effect of quality certifications on ratings when choosing.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Consumer Research
Published
2025-02-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucaf008
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Quality and Supply Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
13.70
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article

Quality Certifications Influence User-Generated Ratings

Nicholas Reinholtz, M. R. Meister
6 citations
Journal of Consumer Research
Quality and Supply Management
13.70
article

Quality Certifications Influence User-Generated Ratings

Nicholas Reinholtz, M. R. Meister
article en
6 citations

Abstract

Abstract Platforms present various certifications to signal the quality of their offerings to prospective consumers. For example, Airbnb.com designates some hosts as “Superhosts” to distinguish properties that provide superior experiences. Platforms also present user-generated ratings—typically elicited and presented as “star ratings”—from their customers for the same purpose. This research investigates the interaction of these signals of quality and suggests a potential downside to platform-provided certifications: They decrease subsequent ratings. In an analysis of over 1,500,000 ratings from Airbnb.com and three follow-up studies, we find that properties with the superhost designation receive lower ratings. We assess the robustness of this result in several ways, including comparing ratings on Airbnb with those for the same property on Vrbo. In three follow-up experiments, we find that the net effect of certifications can lead to reduced choice share: The positive effect of signaling quality is more than offset by the negative effect of reduced ratings. This suggests that consumers are not sufficiently aware of this effect of quality certifications on ratings when choosing.

Journal of Consumer ResearchVol. 52(4)
University of Colorado Boulder (US), University of San Francisco (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Quality and Supply Management
13.70
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