Does Philosophy Need to Know Its History?

Abstract In this essay, I address the question whether philosophy needs to know its history, by comparing and contrasting philosophy with other areas of enquiry. In particular, I emphasize a feature of philosophy that distinguishes it from every other area of enquiry, namely that its history can be a significant contribution to it. That already points towards a positive answer to the question, although the answer takes some teasing out and towards the end of the essay I distinguish between what follows from this answer concerning philosophy as a discipline and what follows from it concerning the practice of individual philosophers. In between, I explore two factors that give philosophy this distinctive relation to its history: what I call Self-Consciousness and what I call Appropriation. By Self-Consciousness, I mean the fact that the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical issue; by Appropriation, I mean the fact that, with respect to any great philosophical idea of the past that is no longer viable, there always remains a question about what we can do with it.