Fairness in the multi-proposer-multi-responder ultimatum game

The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the Ultimatum Game, called the Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum Game. In this model, multiple responders and proposers simultaneously interact in a one-shot game, introducing competition both within proposers and within responders. We derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for all scenarios and explore how these non-trivial values might provide insight into proposal and rejection behaviour experimentally observed in the context of one vs. one Ultimatum Game. Additionally, by considering the asymptotic numbers of players, we propose two potential estimates for a "fair" threshold: either 31.8% or 36.8% of the pie (share) for the responder.

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Publication Details

Journal
PLoS ONE
Published
2025-03-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0319178
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.37

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article

Fairness in the multi-proposer-multi-responder ultimatum game

Rudolf Hanel, Mark Broom, Hana Krakovská
1 citations
PLoS ONE
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
2.37
article

Fairness in the multi-proposer-multi-responder ultimatum game

Rudolf Hanel, Mark Broom, Hana Krakovská
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the Ultimatum Game, called the Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum Game. In this model, multiple responders and proposers simultaneously interact in a one-shot game, introducing competition both within proposers and within responders. We derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for all scenarios and explore how these non-trivial values might provide insight into proposal and rejection behaviour experimentally observed in the context of one vs. one Ultimatum Game. Additionally, by considering the asymptotic numbers of players, we propose two potential estimates for a "fair" threshold: either 31.8% or 36.8% of the pie (share) for the responder.

PLoS ONEVol. 20(3)
City, University of London (GB), Complexity Science Hub (AT), Medical University of Vienna (AT)
HORIZON EUROPE Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions
Openalex Percentile: Top 14%
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
2.37
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