The correlation of theory and conception as elements of law science

The article is devoted to the correlation of theory and conception as structural units of jurisprudence. It examines the commonalities and distinctions between these phenomena, outlining the boundaries of their respective concepts. It is demonstrated that theory and conception represent different elements of legal science, and their conflation is inappropriate. While their content may overlap in many cases, they possess distinct natures, structures, and purposes. The criteria for distinguishing these phenomena are proposed to include dialogicity, hypotheticality, and sociocultural context – characteristics typical of conceptions but not of theories. Conversely, the advantages of theory include clarity, reliability, and recognition, which are not always inherent to concepts. The article presents various scholarly perspectives on the relationship between theory and conception, ranging from conflation to complete differentiation. Sometimes, a conception is characterized as a type of theory or as a structural part of it. The article questions whether it is objectively possible to find a unified formula for the interaction of theory and conception, given the diversity of these phenomena in jurisprudence and science in general. A conception may constitute pre-theoretical knowledge, elucidate the content of a theory, or explain it, among other roles. It is argued that legal theory exists within the system of legal doctrine while a legal conception initially exists outside of it. Upon gaining recognition, a legal conception integrates into legal doctrine and may transform into legal theory. For a single legal phenomenon, there may exist one recognized theory, a corresponding recognized concept, and several unrecognized or less-recognized concepts. It is also possible for several competing legal concepts to coexist without a unified theory, which may still be in the formation process. It is revealed that, in most cases, the creation of a conception (an abstract idea by an author) precedes the formation of a theory (the crystallization of processed knowledge). Less frequently, conceptions and theories are created simultaneously, or a theory is developed before its corresponding concept. The latter occurs through intuitive methodology and later requires explanations provided by the conception. A theory does not imply the disputability of its provisions, whereas a conception allows and supports such dialogue. For a concept, this dialogue represents an opportunity for development, societal adaptation, and scientific-practical recognition.