The right of legislative initiative of the head of state: the experience of France

The article examines the legal nature and features of the implementation of the right of legislative initiative of the head of state as an important element of the system of checks and balances in modern democratic states. Special attention is paid to the comparative analysis of the French and Ukrainian models of implementation of this right. The specific mechanisms of interaction of the president with the government and parliament in the legislative process under the conditions of a mixed republican form of government are considered. It is studied that in France, unlike Ukraine, the president formally does not have the right of legislative initiative, but retains significant influence on the legislative process through chairmanship of the Council of Ministers and interaction with the parliamentary majority. In contrast, in Ukraine, the president is one of the three constitutionally defined subjects of legislative initiative with the additional right to define bills as urgent. Various forms of implementation of the right of legislative initiative of the head of state depending on the type of state system are analyzed. It is established that in parliamentary systems this right usually belongs to the Prime Minister, in presidential systems it is implemented through indirect mechanisms, and in mixed systems it can be exercised both directly and indirectly. It is revealed that the effectiveness of the implementation of this right largely depends on the political configuration in the parliament and government, as well as on the development of the party system. Based on the analysis of European experience, specific features of the distribution of the right of legislative initiative among heads of state in different countries have been identified. It is established that in order to ensure an effective system of checks and balances, some states deliberately do not grant heads of state the right of legislative initiative. It is substantiated that regardless of the form of participation in the law-making process, presidents cannot remain passive observers, since their popular election imposes on them the obligation of active activity in the formation of state policy. The results of the study can be used to improve constitutional and legal mechanisms in Ukraine, in particular in the context of optimizing interaction between branches of government and increasing the efficiency of the legislative process. Of particular value is the analysis of the French experience in implementing the right of legislative initiative in the conditions of a mixed republican form of government, which may be useful for the further development of Ukrainian constitutionalism.