Harmonizing Federalism: Perspective on the simultaneous Election

India is following federal structure dividing powers into state government and central government . While the central government is elected every 5 years, elections to state assemblies are held at different times based on completion of their tenures. This leads to frequent elections almost every year in some state or the other which hampers governance due to enforcement of the model code of conduct. So, the idea of holding simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, commonly referred to as ‘One Nation One Election’, has gained traction in recent years. Proponents argue that the current system of frequent elections is expensive and disruptive. This paper examines the rationale behind One Nation One Election and analyzes its potential consequences on India’s federal structure. The paper critically evaluates the expected benefits like reduced costs and administrative distractions. However, holding synchronous elections raises concerns about compromising the federal structure. State issues may get subsumed under national issues during simultaneous elections. Regional parties could lose their relevance. The paper analyzes how national parties may gain greater control over state politics if assembly polls are tied to Lok Sabha polls. There are also practical difficulties in implementing simultaneous elections such as what will happen in case of mid term dissolution of state assembly. Federalism allows states to chart their own socio economic agendas an advantage that could be undermined. The paper aims to further discuss the scholarly discourse on synchronized elections in India by pointing out its merits as well as the potential pitfalls from the viewpoint of federalism and democracy. The analysis is intended to inform this important policy debate by highlighting the need for nuance and caution.