Photovoltaic Hosting Capacity Assessment for Distribution Networks Based on Stackelberg Game Theory

A bi-level evaluation method for assessing the photovoltaic hosting capacity (PVHC) of distribution networks is proposed, considering the bidirectional electricity purchase and sale relationship between distribution network operators and production and consumption users (PCU). In the upper level, the objective is to maximize the annual revenue of the distribution network operator while minimizing the investment and operational costs of the PCUs. In the lower level, the distribution network operator, acting as the leader, engages in a Stackelberg game with the followers (i.e., the PCU). An electricity trading optimization model is developed, considering the safe operation of the distribution network. By optimizing electricity trading prices and coupling the purchase and sale decisions of the PCUs, a win-win situation is achieved, minimizing the operational cost of the network operator while maximizing the profit of the PCUs. Finally, the effectiveness and rationality of the proposed model are validated through a case study of a distribution network with three PCUs.

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Publication Details

Published
2024-12-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/ceect63656.2024.10898350
Primary Topic
Power Systems and Renewable Energy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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Photovoltaic Hosting Capacity Assessment for Distribution Networks Based on Stackelberg Game Theory

Jun Ren, Zeqi Wang, Ying Jia, Bo Zhang et al.
Power Systems and Renewable Energy
article

Photovoltaic Hosting Capacity Assessment for Distribution Networks Based on Stackelberg Game Theory

Jun Ren, Zeqi Wang, Ying Jia, Bo Zhang, Zihui Wang, Yanbing Jia, Jiajie Liu, Youmei Liu
article en

Abstract

A bi-level evaluation method for assessing the photovoltaic hosting capacity (PVHC) of distribution networks is proposed, considering the bidirectional electricity purchase and sale relationship between distribution network operators and production and consumption users (PCU). In the upper level, the objective is to maximize the annual revenue of the distribution network operator while minimizing the investment and operational costs of the PCUs. In the lower level, the distribution network operator, acting as the leader, engages in a Stackelberg game with the followers (i.e., the PCU). An electricity trading optimization model is developed, considering the safe operation of the distribution network. By optimizing electricity trading prices and coupling the purchase and sale decisions of the PCUs, a win-win situation is achieved, minimizing the operational cost of the network operator while maximizing the profit of the PCUs. Finally, the effectiveness and rationality of the proposed model are validated through a case study of a distribution network with three PCUs.

Taiyuan University of Technology (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 68%
Power Systems and Renewable Energy
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