Joseph Raz and the Duty to Obey the Law

Within the framework of Latin America's commemoration of Joseph Raz, in this work I propose to carefully analyze his position on the so-called “duty to obey the law.” In section 2, I will elaborate in some depth what content Raz assigns to the “duty of obedience to law.” In section 3, I will explore his rejection of the existence of a “general duty of obedience to the law,” and then explore what Raz calls “permissible moral attitudes in relation to the law” in section 4. In section In section 5, I will make some critical considerations about Raz's position, proposing to reflect on whether he ultimately does not end up recognizing the existence of a general duty of obedience within the framework of a reasonably just State. (5.1), whether an attitude of “respect for the law” can be truly voluntary within the framework of its particular conception of autonomy (5.2), and whether the rejection of the existence of this duty can also be sustained if the legitimacy of authority is justified based on the coordination argument (5.3).