Intergovernmental Competition and Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Efficiency: Evidence from China

Against the backdrop of global challenges to food security and China’s push to modernize its agriculture, it is critical to understand how government strategies affect innovation efficiency. This study examines how three modes of intergovernmental competition—fiscal spending competition (strategically increasing public spending to attract resources), tax competition (providing incentives to promote investment), and promotion competition (officials prioritizing short-term projects for promotion)—affect the efficiency of agricultural science and technology innovations across China’s provinces. Utilizing panel data (2000–2021) and a Slack-Based Measure Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA-SBM) model, we find that fiscal spending competition suppresses efficiency, particularly in western regions where infrastructure investments crowd out R&D. Tax competition enhances efficiency, yet its impact is attenuated in central China due to low industrial upgrading. Promotion competition impedes long-term innovation, as frequent official turnover prioritizes short-term projects. Regional heterogeneity highlights eastern China’s market-driven advantages versus central/western regions’ structural constraints. Policy implications advocate for spatially differentiated governance, including R&D tax rebates in the east and cross-regional innovation alliances. This study contributes to fiscal decentralization theory by revealing the nonlinear effects of competition modes on agricultural innovation.