The Decline of Too Big to Fail
For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of “too big to fail.” (G01, G12, G21, G28, G33, H81)
Authors
- Darrell Duffie (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1212-7004)
- Yichao Zhu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9126-2732)
- Antje Berndt (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4436-2885)
Institutions
- Australian National University (AU)
- Stanford University (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- American Economic Review
- Published
- 2025-02-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220846
- Citations
- 5
- Primary Topic
- Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 11.04