A Secure Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Design with Unknown Leader Dynamics Under False Data Injection Attacks
The combination of connectivity and automation allows connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) to operate autonomously using advanced on-board sensors while communicating with each other via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) technology to enhance safety, efficiency, and mobility. One of the most promising features of CAVs is cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC). This system extends the capabilities of conventional adaptive cruise control (ACC) by facilitating the exchange of critical parameters among vehicles to enhance safety, traffic flow, and efficiency. However, increased connectivity introduces new vulnerabilities, making CACC susceptible to cyber-attacks, including false data injection (FDI) attacks, which can compromise vehicle safety. To address this challenge, we propose a secure observer-based control design leveraging Lyapunov stability analysis, which is capable of mitigating the adverse impact of FDI attacks and ensuring system safety. This approach uniquely addresses system security without relying on a known lead vehicle model. The developed approach is validated through simulation results, demonstrating its effectiveness.
Authors
- Arman Sargolzaei (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6047-1870)
- Parisa Ansari Bonab (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8122-8220)
Institutions
- University of South Florida (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Computers
- Published
- 2025-02-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/computers14030084
- Primary Topic
- Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Science Foundation