Stock Repurchase and Corporate Governance : Empirical Evidence in Korean Market

We analyze the influence of corporate governance on share repurchase policies in Korean listed firms from 2013 to 2021 and examine the features of share repurchases in the Korean market. Results reveal that firms with higher corporate governance ratings are more likely to pay dividends but less likely to engage in share repurchases than firms with lower governance ratings. Moreover, market reactions to share repurchase announcements are more positive for firms with higher governance ratings than for those with lower governance ratings. While investors react negatively to treasury share sales announcements, these negative effects are stronger for firms with lower governance ratings than for firms with higher governance ratings. Overall, our findings suggest that, in the Korean market, share repurchases are partly used to protect the control of controlling shareholders rather than to serve their original purpose of payout to shareholders.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Korean Journal of Financial Studies
Published
2025-02-28
DOI
https://doi.org/10.26845/kjfs.2025.02.54.1.41
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.91
Controls
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article

Stock Repurchase and Corporate Governance : Empirical Evidence in Korean Market

Noolee Kim, Hyemin Kim, Seungyub Woo
1 citations
Korean Journal of Financial Studies
Corporate Finance and Governance
3.91
article

Stock Repurchase and Corporate Governance : Empirical Evidence in Korean Market

Noolee Kim, Hyemin Kim, Seungyub Woo
article en
1 citations

Abstract

We analyze the influence of corporate governance on share repurchase policies in Korean listed firms from 2013 to 2021 and examine the features of share repurchases in the Korean market. Results reveal that firms with higher corporate governance ratings are more likely to pay dividends but less likely to engage in share repurchases than firms with lower governance ratings. Moreover, market reactions to share repurchase announcements are more positive for firms with higher governance ratings than for those with lower governance ratings. While investors react negatively to treasury share sales announcements, these negative effects are stronger for firms with lower governance ratings than for firms with higher governance ratings. Overall, our findings suggest that, in the Korean market, share repurchases are partly used to protect the control of controlling shareholders rather than to serve their original purpose of payout to shareholders.

Korean Journal of Financial StudiesVol. 54(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Corporate Finance and Governance
3.91
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Stock Repurchase and Corporate Governance : Empirical Evidence in Korean Market — Noolee Kim, Hyemin Kim, et al. · Korean Journal of Financial Studies (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS