Dual Allegiance, Dual Incentives, Disqualifications from Holding Public Office, and Abusive Judicial Review

Most countries now allow dual citizenship, marking a departure from the traditional conception of the state, which was rooted in feudal law and dominated by notions of indivisible allegiance. This trend raises the question of how countries balance the modern conception of citizenship, with its emphasis on political rights, against traditional notions of indivisible allegiance. I use Ghana, a net-sending country (that is, emigrants exceed immigrants), as a case study to examine this issue. I argue that politicians balance the economic benefits of embracing dual citizenship against the potential cost of direct political competition from returning emigrants. Thus, the country’s laws tolerate dual citizens but only as fractional citizens (citizens with limited political rights). I also posit that the common law remains moored to the feudal conception of loyalty and lacks a broader commitment to democratic participation and protecting the liberal constitutional order. As a result, the courts are quick to sacrifice a pound of political participation for an ounce of loyalty. The analysis suggests that existing theories of dual citizenship that do not account for the terms of admission to the home political community may be inchoate.