Sudije, jezik i tumačenje prava: odgovor na kritike

The article clarifies the theory of legal interpretation introduced in the monograph “Nature and determinants of judicial interpretation of law” regarding the criticisms by Miodrag Jovanović, Goran Dajović and Aleš Novak. Special emphasis is placed on the problems of (1) the relationship between judicial interpretation of law, scientific interpretation of law, and lay interpretation of law, (2) the relationship between natural language and the default understanding of natural language and legal language, as well as (3) determinants that influence the judicial interpretation of law. In connection with these problems, the author draws the following conclusions: (1) judicial interpretation of law, in contrast to scientific and lay interpretation, represents interpretation in a normative function, and judges attribute one of the possible normative meanings to legal texts; (2) the normative meanings of legal texts are not determined by their linguistic content, but are the very rules of interpretation that we call linguistic rules that are formulated and contingently respected within the legal profession; (3) legitimate and illegitimate determinants of judicial interpretation in its two meanings – cognitive and volitional – determine the possibilities of normative meanings of legal texts and decisions about the normative meaning of those texts made by judges. The arguments presented in the text join the arguments presented in the monograph as reasons for accepting realistic (anti-formalist) viewpoints in the theory of legal interpretation.