Lobbying and GR-management in promoting technological change: is a new balance of interests between the state and business possible in Ukraine based on game theory?

The article focuses on substantiating the heuristic and applied potential of game theory as an analytical tool for conceptualizing and transforming lobbying practices in Ukraine. The key idea is that the application of basic game-theoretical models (prisoner’s dilemma, non-zero-sum game, signaling games, etc.) allows not only to diagnose deep institutional deformations of the domestic system of interest representation but also to model optimal directions for its modernization. This idea involves not just stating the status quo in state-business relations, but forming a new post-war paradigm of their interaction based on the game-theoretical approach. The author proves that the transition from the currently dominant «zero-sum game,» oriented towards resource redistribution, to a «positive-sum game,» aimed at creating value through stakeholder cooperation efforts, requires purposeful transformation of the «rules of the game» in lobbying. Game theory offers specific mechanisms for such transformation: normative establishment of transparency and integrity principles, public communication platforms, distribution of risks and benefits through self-regulatory organizations, etc. Using the example of lobbying for a conditional agro-industrial project in the Kharkiv region, the author clearly demonstrates how changing the structure of payoffs can minimize opportunism and stimulate cooperation of key players – investors, authorities, and community. The obtained results have educational-theoretical value for students and teachers and practical value for civil servants and public figures in the context of Ukraine’s post-war recovery. The analysis of lobbying for the conditional agro-industrial project in the Kharkiv region presented in the article: First, it demonstrates the complex nature of relationships between business, government, and community, revealing the hidden conflict of their interests and motives. This encourages practitioners to move away from simplified interpretations of lobbying as «good» or «bad» and focus on creating rules that would align players’ selfish goals with the public good. Second, the considered models (prisoner’s dilemma, non-zero-sum game) provide valuable hints regarding the transformation of incentives towards cooperation. Specific mechanisms such as normative establishment of integrity principles, communication platforms, risk distribution through targeted funds can become a starting point for modernizing domestic GR-management practices.