Procedures in the DMA: non-compliance navigation – Exploring the European Commission’s space for discretion and informality in procedure and decision-making in the Digital Markets Act

The enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) against digital gatekeepers has reached the stage of non-compliance cases. The European Commission as the sole enforcer needs to navigate the unclear procedural territory foreseen in the DMA for such cases. The potential paths differ from procedures in competition law enforcement. The DMA offers a range of options in case of suspected non-compliance, including specification procedures. Yet, there is less space for informal activities of the Commission, such as settlements. The DMA also gives very limited room to commitment decisions that became a standard in antitrust. A particular problem arises when gatekeepers adapt their behaviour during proceedings. In the logic of the DMA, such delayed compliance must still lead to a finding of non-compliance. The procedural routes show that the DMA is a hybrid of top-down-enforcement and negotiated enforcement with a three-step-enforcement escalation. <br>

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Publication Details

Journal
European Competition Journal
Published
2025-02-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2025.2464959
Primary Topic
European and International Contract Law
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Procedures in the DMA: non-compliance navigation – Exploring the European Commission’s space for discretion and informality in procedure and decision-making in the Digital Markets Act

Rupprecht Podszun, Jasper van den Boom
European Competition Journal
European and International Contract Law
article

Procedures in the DMA: non-compliance navigation – Exploring the European Commission’s space for discretion and informality in procedure and decision-making in the Digital Markets Act

Rupprecht Podszun, Jasper van den Boom
article en

Abstract

The enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) against digital gatekeepers has reached the stage of non-compliance cases. The European Commission as the sole enforcer needs to navigate the unclear procedural territory foreseen in the DMA for such cases. The potential paths differ from procedures in competition law enforcement. The DMA offers a range of options in case of suspected non-compliance, including specification procedures. Yet, there is less space for informal activities of the Commission, such as settlements. The DMA also gives very limited room to commitment decisions that became a standard in antitrust. A particular problem arises when gatekeepers adapt their behaviour during proceedings. In the logic of the DMA, such delayed compliance must still lead to a finding of non-compliance. The procedural routes show that the DMA is a hybrid of top-down-enforcement and negotiated enforcement with a three-step-enforcement escalation. <br>

European Competition JournalVol. 21(3)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (DE)
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Arts and Humanities Research Council
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 95%
European and International Contract Law
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