Does Marx have a method?

This previously unpublished lecture was delivered by Gillian Rose in 1987 at the University of Sussex, as part of a multi-lecturer series called Sociological Theory and Methodology. In it, Rose explores the concept of ‘method’ in Marx's work and its broader implications for philosophy and social theory. Against the tendency to interpret and employ Marx's thought instrumentally or dogmatically, Rose emphasises its dialectical character. Unlike traditional notions of method as a set of rules or procedures for inquiry, Rose defines Marx's method as a process that ‘follows the path’ (from the etymology of method: meta-hodos ) from what we perceive as immediate experience to its social mediations, showing how specific concrete relations give rise to systematic subjective illusion. The lecture concludes by describing the ‘paradox’ of sociological reason: ‘The general statement of rules always presupposes the results which are to be explained. They are an essential and deadly exercise. […] Sociology must be disciplined or methodological in order to be rational. But equally, it must recognise its inherent tendency to lose its object if it becomes excessively instrumental. Hence, it must constantly radicalise its methods.’ In typical fashion, Rose challenges us to resist the allure of abstract methods, fixed positions or any other form of intellectual comfort, and offers a stark warning of the dangers of such complacency.