A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Data Sharing Under Government Regulations

The tripartite evolutionary game model focuses on the strategic choices and evolutionary laws of three parties in dynamic interaction. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, Enterprise A, and Enterprise B, this paper analyzes the strategic choices of enterprise data sharing from the perspective of government regulation and uses the simulation method to assign and simulate the parameters of the model. Furthermore, the evolutionary trends of the behavioral strategies of the three parties are analyzed under the changes of factors such as the government’s regulation costs, government penalties, government rewards, and the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data. The findings indicate that when the benefits obtained by enterprises from data sharing are relatively high, and the compensation fees incurred by enterprises to obtain the other party’s data are sufficient to compensate for the losses caused by the other party’s data sharing, enterprises will tend to choose “data-sharing”. At this time, the combined strategy of “no-regulation, data-sharing, data-sharing” reaches an equilibrium point. In this combination strategy, the initial willingness of the government and enterprises will not affect the final evolutionary result. The government’s regulation costs, government penalties, and government rewards will not affect the final behavioral strategy evolutionary result for the government and enterprises. However, the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data will affect the final evolutionary direction of the three parties. When the compensation fees for enterprises to obtain shared data are low, enterprises are more inclined toward “no-data-sharing”.