Event-Causal Libertarianism, Indeterministic Weightings, and the Pragmatic Approach

Abstract In his recent book, Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love, John Lemos defends an event-causal libertarian account of free will and argues that the belief in such free will plays an important, if not essential, role in supporting certain vital values. This paper examines Lemos’ account, critically evaluating his event-causal libertarianism and his pragmatic justification of belief in such free will. It begins by examining the libertarian account of Robert Kane, since Lemos defends a modified version of it, and then moves on to Lemos’ own indeterministic weightings view. In the second half of the paper, I then critically examine Lemos’ pragmatic defense of libertarian free will. I argue that the libertarian accounts of Kane and Lemos both face insurmountable difficulties, and Lemos’ pragmatic defense of libertarianism is unconvincing.