Redirecting revenues from law enforcement fines, forfeitures, and related fees to fund local nonprofits: a policy design proposal

Abstract Monetary sanctions in law enforcement, including fines, forfeitures, and related fees, are susceptible to exploitation by agencies for self-serving profit motives. However, a key challenge in addressing this issue is disentangling the agencies’ profit-driven motives from their genuine commitment to upholding law and order. Against this backdrop, this study examines a novel policy design proposal: redirecting revenues from law enforcement to fund local nonprofits. This approach seeks to eliminate conflicts of interest without restricting the use of monetary sanctions as a tool for law enforcement, while simultaneously channeling revenues toward community benefits. Experimental evidence based on a representative sample of US adults (n = 1,030) further highlights this approach’s potential to improve public perceptions of, and attitudes toward, law enforcement agencies. The study concludes by discussing the broader implications of this proposal for the political economy of law enforcement, as well as key considerations and potential challenges for its implementation.