Exploring MEC Server Strategy in Blockchain Networks: Mining for Mobile Users or for Self

Blockchain-based decentralized applications (DApps) offer enhanced security and decentralization features; nevertheless, their maintenance demands substantial computational resources and poses challenges for deployment in mobile networks. To address this, a number of studies have explored offloading blockchain mining tasks from mobile users to mobile edge computing (MEC) servers. However, the existing literature overlooks the fact that MEC servers can not only mine for mobile users but also mine for themselves, potentially explaining why MEC mining offloading has not gained broad acceptance within the industry. In this work, we exploit a more practical case and rethink the question of whether MEC servers lease computing power to mobile users by taking into account that MEC servers can mine for themselves. We establish a game model and apply backward induction to analytically characterize Nash equilibria for mining strategies adopted by MEC and mobile users. Our findings suggest that, if MEC can mine for self, MEC would mine for mobile users only under specific conditions where mobile users possess superior information gathering capability (at least better than the MEC server) or the whole blockchain system exhibits significant network value. We further provide a series of simulations to verify our conclusion and illustrate the impact of network parameters on the strategies of both sides.