MAD MAN, SLEEPER, AND FIRE AVICENNA ON THE PERCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL

Abstract Avicenna is well-known for rejecting Aristotle’s dichotomy between perception and the intellect by introducing the so-called estimative power, which connects perception and the intellect. The estimative power is similar to sensory cognition because what is estimated is always mixed with the sensibles. Additionally, the proper object of estimation is the individualised ma c nā , which seems similar to the object of the intellect as the intelligible ma c nā . Given the special role of estimation, scholars have recently begun debating whether Avicenna has a conceptualist theory of perception. This article contributes to that debate by focusing on Avicenna’s discussions about the perception of externals in Al-ta c līqāt . I argue for a reading that steers between Mohammad Azadpur’s conceptualist reading and Luis Farjeat’s anti-conceptualist reading. For Avicenna, the presence of the sensible form in a sensory power is non-conceptual, but the perceptual judgement exhibits a weak epistemic conceptualism.