The Search for an Optimal Framework for Licensing Standard-Essential Patents: Is Collective Licensing a Solution?

Abstract The emergence of new technological paradigms, particularly the Internet of Things, has given rise to doubts about whether the current framework for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) will be effective in the near future. Consequently, there is a renewed interest in exploring multilateral licensing schemes. One such proposal seeks to establish a public quasi-pool Agency to administer SEP licensing by issuing licences, and collecting and distributing royalties among SEP holders. This article analyses the suitability of the said Agency. It finds that the envisaged Agency could improve SEP licensing by, inter alia , alleviating patent holdout and patent holdup, and reducing transactions costs. Weighed against the pursued general interests, i.e. improving SEP licensing and promoting the dissemination of standardised technologies across the EU, we find that licensing SEPs via the envisioned Agency is unlikely to disproportionately interfere with the fundamental rights of patentees.