Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected

Results of two studies demonstrate that long and unexpected waits adversely shape moral behavior. In Study 1, passengers who had just joined the check-in line at Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in, and then their actual wait duration was recorded. After checking in, they privately rolled a die, reported an outcome while knowing that higher reports yield higher earnings. We found that wait duration is positively associated with lying. Study 2 (laboratory experiment) exogenized the duration of waits (long versus short) and whether those durations were known (expected) or unknown (unexpected) to subjects in advance. We find that long waits cause, on average, more lying than short waits, and that average lying is the highest for long and unexpected waits. We propose that after long and unexpected waits, people may seek compensation in the monetary domain via relaxed morals. • Two studies document that lengthy waiting is associated with increased lying. • Study 1 is correlational, and Study 2 is a laboratory study. • Study 2 presents causal evidence that long and unexpected waits cause the most lying. • We propose that unexpectedly long waits prompt seeking monetary compensation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Published
2025-02-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106939
Primary Topic
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Type
article
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article

Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected

Yossef Tobol, Gergely Hajdú, Linda Dezső
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
article

Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected

Yossef Tobol, Gergely Hajdú, Linda Dezső
article en

Abstract

Results of two studies demonstrate that long and unexpected waits adversely shape moral behavior. In Study 1, passengers who had just joined the check-in line at Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in, and then their actual wait duration was recorded. After checking in, they privately rolled a die, reported an outcome while knowing that higher reports yield higher earnings. We found that wait duration is positively associated with lying. Study 2 (laboratory experiment) exogenized the duration of waits (long versus short) and whether those durations were known (expected) or unknown (unexpected) to subjects in advance. We find that long waits cause, on average, more lying than short waits, and that average lying is the highest for long and unexpected waits. We propose that after long and unexpected waits, people may seek compensation in the monetary domain via relaxed morals. • Two studies document that lengthy waiting is associated with increased lying. • Study 1 is correlational, and Study 2 is a laboratory study. • Study 2 presents causal evidence that long and unexpected waits cause the most lying. • We propose that unexpectedly long waits prompt seeking monetary compensation.

Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVol. 232
Vienna University of Economics and Business (AT), Austrian Institute of Economic Research (AT), Universität für Weiterbildung Krems (AT), Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (AT), Tel Hai Academic College (IL)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 96%
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected — Yossef Tobol, Gergely Hajdú, et al. · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS