Can Plurilaterals Solve the WTO’s National Security Crisis?

Abstract National security poses an existential threat to the WTO and trade multilateralism. The accommodation reached between trade and security under the GATT is no longer sufficient, and the United States has taken the WTO hostage until a new accommodation is reached. This article explores whether plurilateral agreements between a subset of WTO members can help resolve the crisis. It begins by explaining why national security poses such a challenge to multilateral trade. It analyzes how the prevailing interpretation of the existing GATT security exception addresses some but not all dimensions of the challenge. And it proposes how plurilateral agreements may do so instead, including by supporting a multilateral agreement to broaden the current GATT security exception or by creating a parallel dispute settlement mechanism for disputes not involving national security. It suggests that such agreements should be encouraged within the WTO to preserve the institution’s relevance in this new geopolitical era.