Functionalist and Phenomenological Approaches to the Problem of Artificial Intelligence: Comparative Analysis of the Concepts of R. Brandom and H. Dreyfus in the Context of Technological Development

The article examines the philosophical concepts of artificial intelligence developed by representatives of the Pittsburgh School, particularly R. Brandom, in juxtaposition with the critical stance of H. Dreyfus. Key aspects of the functionalist approach to artificial intelligence are analyzed, including the problem of algorithmic decomposition of cognitive abilities and the potential for creating autonomous discursive practices. Particular attention is paid to the Brandom’s concept of “pragmatic AI”, which offers an alternative to the classical symbolic approach. The problem of non-monotonicity of reasoning as the main technical obstacle in the development of artificial intelligence is investigated. Furthermore, Dreyfus’s phenomenological critique emphasizes the significance of embodied experience and contextual understanding in human cognition. Conclusion drawn from this comparative analysis underscores the necessity of rethinking traditional approaches to artificial intelligence development in light of modern philosophical discussions concerning the nature of intelligence and cognition.