Practising reflexivity: Ethico-epistemological and political practice?

In recent times, the term reflexivity has gained prominence in bioethics. For scholars engaged in both qualitative and quantitative research methods, particularly amid the prevailing climate of the empirical turn and reflexive turn, the concept of reflexivity opens up diverse epistemological and methodological possibilities. Given the varied moral paradigms and normative assumptions that shape applied ethics scholars’ understanding of moral knowledge, it becomes imperative to explore what practising reflexivity entails and how it impacts the discourse within the domain of applied ethics, especially in so-called empirical bioethics. In this paper, I aim to examine the current conversations surrounding reflexivity in bioethics scholarship, offering a critical analysis of the dominant interpretations of this concept. Acknowledging the limitations of thin reflexivity, which risks reinforcing the status quo through its depoliticized approach and lack of critical engagement with systemic issues in the politics of knowledge, my argument is that reflexivity should be understood as an ethical, epistemological and political practice that demystifies the process of knowing. Practising thick reflexivity not only requires acknowledging that the pursuit of knowledge is neither value-neutral nor value-free, but also involves seeking knowledge that explicitly accounts for inherent value commitments. This approach enables a deeper understanding of the complexities of social, moral and political realities. I conclude that embracing reflexivity necessitates a recognition of the politics of knowing, specifically, the non-innocence inherent in our processes of knowledge production, construction and representation of moral and social realities.