Nigitology: Heidegger vs. Leibniz

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of attempts at ontological development of the problem of Nothingness, presented in philosophical systems Leibniz and Heidegger. The article shows that despite the fundamentally different premises and strategies of thinking, as well as the obvious opposition of styles of philosophizing - the clarity and validity of Leibniz's argumentation against the fluidity and hermeneutic "questioning" of Heidegger - in the course of philosophical searches for the ultimate foundations of Being, one can discover non-surface points of intersection in their reflections on the nature and status of negativity. The author examines in detail the methodological strategies of "thinking through" Nothingness and reveals similar intuitions in understanding the conceptual content and philosophical status of the category of Nothingness. The novelty of the study lies in identifying specific points of intersection between Leibniz and Heidegger in the philosophical discourse on the nature of negativity. It is particularly emphasized that despite the difference in styles of philosophizing and considering Nothingness, we are dealing with the “non-present presence of Nothingness”, where the latter appears not as a negation or “deprivation”, but is filled with positive content. The similarity of the philosophizing of Leibniz and Heidegger was also manifested in their search for new terms in an attempt to reform the language of traditional metaphysics. It is shown that historical and philosophical schematism with its “-isms” and “-ologies” is not always productive, since it simplifies and obscures some aspects that are not obvious and important for understanding the ideas of a particular philosopher. By penetrating the history of metaphysics with various methods in search of an answer to the question “Does the non-existent exist?”, they thereby support and develop the historical tradition of metaphysics as “philosophia perennis,” treating it as an eternal present.