The logic of the “reverse account”: real estate profitability and public interest in the PIU Vila Leopoldina-Villa-Lobos urban project in São Paulo

This paper investigates changes in the logic underpinning the use of urban incentives in the form of inclusive housing policies, relating the relevant literature to the case study of the Vila Leopoldina-Villa-Lobos Urban Intervention Project (PIU-VL) in São Paulo-SP. The case reveals a shift in the mechanisms of municipal financing in which the traditional model of capturing the surplus value calculated from the available building potential of the territory has been transformed into an “inverse account”, in which the cost of executing public interest interventions (primarily housing) becomes the amount of surplus value to be captured. The paper concludes that the “inverse account” aligns with the dynamics of public-private partnerships, poses risks of subordinating public interest to the logics of the real estate and finance, and is structured around private real estate profitability not only as a foundational element, but above all, as a limiting factor for public-interest interventions, thereby weakening the commitments of the public authorities toward the affected population.