Collaborative Governance Strategies for Fever Clinics: A Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game Analysis
Government subsidies and punishments under a certain threshold effectively promoted the participation of primary and non-primary healthcare institutions in pandemic prevention and control. Additionally, participation in public supervision gradually increased with the gradual evolution of the pandemic. Therefore, our results suggested that the government should actively explore reasonable, dynamic thresholds for subsidies and punishments, promote public participation through diversified means, and explore diverse operation types of fever clinics to address the challenges of emerging infectious diseases in the future.
Authors
- Erhong Meng (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4573-3430)
- K. J. Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2186-5826)
- Weiqi Huang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6493-0974)
- Huan Liu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3264-7904)
- Hongyu Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5405-9401)
- Yingxin Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8230-5497)
- Long Yin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2822-6602)
- Qunhong Wu
Institutions
- Harbin Medical University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Risk Management and Healthcare Policy
- Published
- 2025-02-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.2147/rmhp.s497125
- Primary Topic
- Complex Systems and Decision Making
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China