Imagining transnational solidarity in the EU through Hegel’s idea of mutual recognition

How do we, EU constitutional scholars, define solidarity? For the most part, solidarity is used as a political soundbite for something that is generally seen as ‘good’ or normatively desirable. In this paper, I make two arguments. On the one hand, I critically reflect upon the dominant approach in EU law under which solidarity as a principle chiefly governs relations between the Member States. Citizens in the EU are at the moment not a unit of concern for which solidarity produces legal outcomes. On the other, based on Durkheim's work on enlightened self-interest, I show that measures in EU law that invoke solidarity mainly do so on economic grounds and do not allow for the creation of socioeconomic and political bonds between citizens in the EU. I then turn to what solidarity in the EU could be. By revisiting Hegel's idea of mutual recognition as the condition for freedom, I offer a more robust understanding of solidarity. Finally, I offer a brief look into potential areas where solidarity might become a meaningful principle for connecting citizens for non-economic purposes and by offering thoughts on space for further research.