Teoretické problémy ústavního principu nezávislosti centrální banky

Central bank independence finds its limits in the Constitution of the Czech Republic of 1993, Art. 98, defining the objective of a central bank and a scope of its powers. A legal theory has established a list of features of central bank independence, distinguishing between features of an institutional, functional, personal, financial or budgetary nature. Central bank independence is required when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon a central bank. Features of central bank independence should therefore be considered from that perspective. Such features should not be seen as a kind of legislation, going beyond the scope of the Constitution, but as tools to facilitate an assessment of the independence principle. Central bank independence is not a matter which can be expressed in arithmetical formulae or applied in a mechanical manner and the way in which it is achieved is therefore assessed on a case-by-case basis.

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Publication Details

Journal
AUC IURIDICA
Published
2025-02-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.14712/23366478.2025.152
Primary Topic
Taxation and Legal Issues
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Teoretické problémy ústavního principu nezávislosti centrální banky

Michal Tomášek
AUC IURIDICA
Taxation and Legal Issues
article

Teoretické problémy ústavního principu nezávislosti centrální banky

Michal Tomášek
article en

Abstract

Central bank independence finds its limits in the Constitution of the Czech Republic of 1993, Art. 98, defining the objective of a central bank and a scope of its powers. A legal theory has established a list of features of central bank independence, distinguishing between features of an institutional, functional, personal, financial or budgetary nature. Central bank independence is required when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon a central bank. Features of central bank independence should therefore be considered from that perspective. Such features should not be seen as a kind of legislation, going beyond the scope of the Constitution, but as tools to facilitate an assessment of the independence principle. Central bank independence is not a matter which can be expressed in arithmetical formulae or applied in a mechanical manner and the way in which it is achieved is therefore assessed on a case-by-case basis.

AUC IURIDICAVol. 48(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 97%
Taxation and Legal Issues
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