Zásady mezinárodního práva životního prostředí

Within any legal system, one can distinguish between general concepts and principles on the one hand, and specific, detailed rules on the other hand. Since the term “principles” seems to be used as homonym by the doctrine of International Law, it is vital to make a clear distinction of its different meanings. In fact, international legal documents as well as the doctrine usually refer to principles of International Environmental Law in two or three meanings. The first one includes the principles representing – in generalized expression – binding legal norms (lex lata). They include (a) the principle of state sovereignty and nonharmful use of environment outside the national jurisdiction; (b) the principle of protection and conservation of the environment and natural resources; (c) the principle of international cooperation in environmental protection; (d) the principle of exchange of information on activities involving a risk of environmental harm; (e) the principle of prevention; (f) the principle of equitable use of the shared natural resources. Of a different nature seems to be the principle of international responsibility and liability for damage to environment. It appears in Principle 22 of the 1972 Stockholm declaration merely as a pactum de contrahendo. Its normative content is not yet well established in general international law and depends on provisions of the specific international treaties. Another set of principles can be called general concepts and principles of International Environmental Law de lege ferenda. Having mostly the nature of recommendation or programme, those principles reflect the recent achievements and stimulate the future development in this particular field of law. They include (a) the concept of sustainable development; (b) the precautionary principle; (c) the principle of common concern of humanity; (d) the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; (e) the principle “polluter pays”. The actual role of the principles should be neither overestimated nor underestimated. They are not able to replace a normative function of the specific legal rules. However, they make easier the systematization and interpretation of various branches of law. This is true especially in International Environmental Law, which has today developed in a very large and dynamic branch. This corpus juris may be even considered as a laboratory used for testing new institutions, concepts and techniques of International Law.