Electoral Reform, Mandate-divide, and Legislative Particularism

Abstract The mixed-member system incorporates representation of list and nominal tiers with an expectation of ‘mandate-divide’ to balance national and particularistic interests. This study examines interest distribution in bill sponsorships to test the mandate-divide hypothesis, focusing on Taiwan’s transition from a single nontransferable vote ( SNTV ) in multi-member districts ( MMD s) to single-member districts ( SMD s) for the nominal (regional) tier but maintaining closed-list proportional representation ( CLPR ) for the list tier. Findings reveal that regional legislators sponsored more bills, especially those addressing particularistic interests, than list members, both before and after the electoral reform. However, following the reform, regional legislators significantly increased their legislative focus on public interests, surpassing even that of list members. The study suggests that SNTV -elected regional legislators are incentivised to represent specific groups, whereas SMD -elected regional legislators act as ‘catch-all representatives’ for representing broader constituencies. Electoral reform provides regional legislators with incentives to behave differently in the legislative focus of interest distribution.