Event‐triggered security control of networked switched systems under denial‐of‐service attacks: A dual‐channel transmission case

Abstract The paper investigates the event‐triggered security control of networked switched systems (NSSs) under denial‐of‐service (DoS) attacks through dual‐channel transmission. To actively defend against DoS attacks, a Stackelberg game is employed to characterize the interaction between the defender and the DoS attacker, with the defender assuming the role of leader and the attacker as follower. Furthermore, a simulated annealing algorithm is utilized to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solution, from which packet loss rates of dual channels are derived. In order to optimize communication resources and prevent asynchronous switching caused by triggering conditions, a novel event‐triggered mechanism is proposed. Considering the open‐loop and asynchronous scenarios caused by DoS attacks, zero‐input and hold‐input control strategy along with an appropriate switching law are jointly designed to ensure the almost sure stability of NSSs. Finally, a practical example involving the networked continuous stirred tank reactor system is provided to validate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed method.