Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry

With the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative innovation in the ICV sector, the dispersal of industrial chain resources, and the absence of enduring and consistent cooperation pose significant obstacles to value co-creation. Therefore, this paper constructs a value co-creation evolutionary game model of the innovation ecosystem of the ICV industry with the automotive enterprise, an intelligent automotive solution provider and the government as players, and applies prospect theory to optimize the tripartite evolutionary game. The payment matrix is established, the expected revenue is analyzed for each player’s strategies, and the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation. The aim is to promote value co-creation by analyzing the co-evolution mechanism of various stakeholder strategies in the ICV innovation ecosystem. The results show the following: (1) The best evolutionary stability strategy is the positive cross-border cooperation between the automotive enterprise and the intelligent automotive solution provider, while the government gradually does not provide subsidies. (2) The government’s subsidy support should be controlled within an appropriate range. If the subsidy is too great, the marginal effect of incentives will gradually weaken. (3) The players’ willingness to integrate across borders can be enhanced by a higher level of trust and resource complementarity between the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider. Also, liquidated damages and opportunity loss can effectively prevent the occurrence of negative integration behaviors. (4) The greater the risk attitude coefficient and risk aversion coefficient of the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider, the more conducive they are to the occurrence of positive integration behavior.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2025-02-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13020121
Citations
1
Primary Topic
E-commerce and Technology Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.45

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Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry

Dan Zhao, Jinhuan Tang, Yiming Chen, Wang Jia
1 citations
Systems
E-commerce and Technology Innovations
2.45
article

Research on Value Co-Creation Evolution Mechanism of Cross-Border Cooperation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Industry

Dan Zhao, Jinhuan Tang, Yiming Chen, Wang Jia
article en
1 citations

Abstract

With the continuous development of information and communication technology, “software-defined vehicle” has become the trend of the times. The intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is becoming a new direction for the development of the automotive industry. Nevertheless, the absence of cooperative innovation in the ICV sector, the dispersal of industrial chain resources, and the absence of enduring and consistent cooperation pose significant obstacles to value co-creation. Therefore, this paper constructs a value co-creation evolutionary game model of the innovation ecosystem of the ICV industry with the automotive enterprise, an intelligent automotive solution provider and the government as players, and applies prospect theory to optimize the tripartite evolutionary game. The payment matrix is established, the expected revenue is analyzed for each player’s strategies, and the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation. The aim is to promote value co-creation by analyzing the co-evolution mechanism of various stakeholder strategies in the ICV innovation ecosystem. The results show the following: (1) The best evolutionary stability strategy is the positive cross-border cooperation between the automotive enterprise and the intelligent automotive solution provider, while the government gradually does not provide subsidies. (2) The government’s subsidy support should be controlled within an appropriate range. If the subsidy is too great, the marginal effect of incentives will gradually weaken. (3) The players’ willingness to integrate across borders can be enhanced by a higher level of trust and resource complementarity between the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider. Also, liquidated damages and opportunity loss can effectively prevent the occurrence of negative integration behaviors. (4) The greater the risk attitude coefficient and risk aversion coefficient of the automotive enterprise and intelligent automotive solution provider, the more conducive they are to the occurrence of positive integration behavior.

SystemsVol. 13(2)
Shenyang Aerospace University (CN), Anhui University of Technology (CN), Northeastern University (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, Science Foundation of Ministry of Education of China
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
E-commerce and Technology Innovations
2.45
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