Effects of other-regarding preferences on cooperation in networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game

The impact of other-regarding preferences (ORP) on the evolution of cooperation has attracted widespread attention in recent years. However, most of them assume that individuals have the same ORP intensity, there are few studies that consider the heterogeneity of ORP. In this paper, we investigate the effects of ORP on the cooperation evolution in a networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The research introduces a utility function that incorporates the intensity and heterogeneity of ORP within the population, as well as a priming coefficient to simulate the influence of value activation on the ORP behavior . Simulation results indicate that increasing the intensity of positive ORP consistently enhances cooperation levels, while high ORP heterogeneity has a nuanced impact: it suppresses cooperation when the ORP intensity is positive by introducing selfish individuals, but can mitigate defection when the mean ORP intensity is negative by allowing positive ORP individuals to counterbalance the negative ones. Additionally, we explore the effects of priming strategies, showing that priming positive ORP individuals significantly promotes cooperation. The results highlight the importance of targeted interventions in the promotion of sustainable cooperation in complex systems. • The proposed evolutionary model considers weighted payoff differences with neighbors. • Positive intensity of other-regarding preferences enhances cooperation. • Heterogeneity of other-regarding preferences has a dual effect on the cooperation. • Priming individuals with positive other-regarding preferences promotes cooperation.