Cash and Carry Democracy: Assessing the Impact of Vote Buying/Selling on Nigeria Political Development
This paper interrogates the political economy of Money politics in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, with particular focus on factors that are responsible for vote buying, how the use of money influence electoral outcome and extent in which vote buying has impacted on the electoral process in Nigeria. The research design adopted was case study research approach to demonstrate that money politics vis-a-vis vote buying has detrimental effects on Nigeria's democracy and unregulated political party finance affects Nigeria electoral process vis-à-vis electoral credibility. It encourages political patronage and clientele networks where political funders control and select politicians, thereby forsaking good governance and growth. Utilising the exchange approach theory as the tool for analysis illustrated relative power of participants in the exchange, conditioned by the principle of mutuality where electoral window in Nigeria political terrain is conceived by the elite as investment venture of which profit is to be maximized by means of exchange of electorates voting power for money, entrenchment of poverty and by extension hold the electoral system to hostage via manipulation, corruption and election irregularities and weak judicial system. The report suggests amongst others, the necessity for public enlightenment on the hazards of votes buying, while organisations responsible for the management of elections must ensure strict compliance with electoral rules.
Authors
- Usman Mohammed (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5158-2755)
- Yahaya Alilu
- Sunday Edegbo
- Egwemi-Ugbeda Ejura
- Olekwara Tochukwu
- Success Obi
Publication Details
- Journal
- International Journal of Strategic Research in Public Administration and Organizational Process
- Published
- 2024-11-23
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48028/iiprds/ijsrpaop.v4.i1.03
- Primary Topic
- Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00