A Study on the Application of UNSGM for Chemical and Biological Weapons Verification in North Korea

North Korea's willingness and capability to develop WMD pose a significant threat to global peace and security. Effective preparatory measures for verification mechanisms applicable in various potential situations in NK are necessary to mitigate these threats. This study presents the application of the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM) as the most effective verification system that the international community can adopt in response to NK's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBWs) threats. The UNSGM grants unique authority to the UN Secretary-General to investigate allegations of CBWs use, imposing obligations on all UN member states. This study analyzes the applicability of UNSGM in comparison with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) based on the criteria of 'treaty applicability,' 'legal bindingness under international law,' and 'institutional mechanisms of treaty implementation.' Additionally, by analyzing past activities of the UNSGM, it is confirmed that UNSGM can overcome the limitations of the CWC and BWC and act as a more extensive and effective tool in terms of international legal bindingness and institutional mechanisms. Considering that NK is a UN member state, not a party to the CWC, and a signatory to the BWC with no institutional mechanism, the UNSGM is likely the only verification system in the event of a CBWs suspicion in NK. This study assumes 5 scenarios of CBWs verification in NK and proposes specific ways in which UNSGM can be effectively utilized in each scenario. This can contribute not only to deterring the use of NK's CBWs but also to establishing a foundation for an effective verification mechanism during wartime and peacetime.