A Study on the Balance of Ground Forces on the Korean Peninsula

The main argument of this paper is that the balance of ground forces on the Korean Peninsula should no longer be studied solely through the 'military components' approach, which often involves narrow quantification. Instead, an evaluation based on asymmetry is necessary. The key research question of this paper is: Who holds superiority in ground forces on the Korean Peninsula? This study employs both quantitative and qualitative research within the overarching assessment methodology to address this core question. Additionally, it aims to present an objective comparison of the threats and examines the military, strategic, doctrinal, geographical, and meteorological asymmetries between the two countries. This approach identifies ways to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses while minimizing our own. To achieve this, the study is divided into two phases. The first phase involves a quantitative comparison of the personnel and major ground combat equipment of both countries. The second phase qualitatively compares defense strategies, military doctrines, and geographical and meteorological factors, identifying the relative asymmetries of the ground forces of both countries. Based on this analysis, the study presents scenarios that objectively compare the threats. It suggests ways to minimize our vulnerabilities and highlight the enemy’s weaknesses, grounded in the adversary’s potential courses of action. The findings of the study indicate that, under current conditions, North Korea lacks the means to offset the qualitative superiority of the South Korean military, aside from its nuclear forces. The longer the competition endures, the more disadvantageous the situation becomes for North Korea. However, if South Korea’s quantitative disadvantage in manpower continues to grow, there is a risk that the qualitative advantage could be neutralized. Consequently, North Korea is likely to develop three types of provocation scenarios based on five categories of war spectrum, and it was found that both countries possess force structures that are unfavorable for initiating a preemptive strike. Thus, the study recommends planning threat-based forces and strategies to prevent North Korea from initiating provocations.