North Korea’s aggressive Nuclear Strategy and General Nuclear Compellence

This paper aims to explain North Korea's aggressive nuclear strategy from the perspective of “general nuclear compellence.” “General nuclear compellence” refers to the signaling of “the risk of nuclear escalation” in non-crisis situations to create a favorable environment for “changing the status quo” by securing political concessions from both adversaries and allies. This concept is useful for understanding how nuclear-armed states seek to reduce their security dependence on allies, enhance their external autonomy over the long term, increase military deterrence against adversaries, and expand their political negotiation space. While most existing nuclear-related research has focused on “immediate compellence” during military standoffs, there has been less attention given to “general compellence,” which seeks to compel concessions from allies and adversaries over the medium to long term. It is noteworthy that existing academic discussions generally assert that the effectiveness of “immediate nuclear coercion” during crises is limited, as suggested by Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann in Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Recently, the argument that nuclear possession can alter the comprehensive political calculations of both allies and adversaries during “peacetime” has gained traction. This perspective provides a significant theoretical foundation for diagnosing the intentions and political effects of North Korea's aggressive nuclear strategy.