La judicialización de la política y el control constitucional en modelos híbridos restringidos: el activismo judicial por “defecto” de ParaguayThe judicialization of politics and judicial review in restricted hybrid models: judicial activism by “defa

Abstract Does the institutional design of constitutional review affect the judicialization of politics and judicial behavior? Traditionally, political factors and the personal characteristics of judges are considered the main explanations for judicial behavior, often overlooking the role of institutional design. This article examines the “restricted hybrid” model of constitutional review in Paraguay, a country with low political polarization due to party hegemony, yet marked by judicial activism. The analysis of the Constitutional Chamber between 1995 and 2015 reveals that the restricted hybrid design influences judges voting behavior, suggesting that judicial activism is not necessarily a deliberate strategy but an unintended consequence of the institutional design. In contexts of low polarization and restricted constitutional review, like in Paraguay, judges have shown deference to strong presidents but not to strong congresses.