Self-referring as self-directed action
Abstract I propose that examining pointing and, especially, self-pointing helps us to better understand Self-Referring (knowingly and intentionally self-referring). I explain basic features of pointing and self-pointing, such as referring, reference-fixing and the subject’s knowledge of the referent. I propose to treat Self-Referring as a self-directed action. Self-pointing makes it explicit how Self-Referring is a self-directed action produced for intentionally expressing something about the agent of the self-directed action. My project is an attempt to naturalize the capacity for Self-Reference. The capacity for self-directed action predates and enables the acquisition of Self-Referring. The structure of self-pointing reveals how the referent of ‘I’ is fixed in such way that we can begin to see how it supports the cognitive significance of Self-Referring expressions. In arguing for my proposal, I reflect on findings from developmental and comparative psychology and analyze Self-Reference in both spoken and sign-languages.
Authors
- Krisztina Orbán (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5440-8808)
Institutions
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Tübingen (DE)
- University of Tübingen (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2025-02-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02283-2
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.12
Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Volkswagen Foundation
- Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen